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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a host of developing countries have experienced robust economic growth but to 
sustain such growth prospects these countries need to significantly increase investment in 
infrastructure.1 To bridge the investment gap they currently face, developing countries need both to 
improve the quality of public spending in infrastructure as well as to attract more private capital. 
Rapid urbanization and economic growth, demographic trends, and climate change are all but some 
of the challenges that developing countries have to face and that call for an acceleration of public and 
private investments to rehabilitate, upgrade, and expand their infrastructures. Moreover, sustaining 
good quality of infrastructure service delivery requires a better composition of the infrastructure 
stock, a good level of maintenance, and an appropriate sequencing of institutional reforms across 
sectors including the financial sector.  
 
Low or non-existent sovereign credit ratings and the absence of proper financial instruments to 
mitigate risks inherent to infrastructure projects are among the factors that limit private commitments 
in developing regions’ infrastructure projects.2 After a sharp decline from relatively high levels in the 
mid-1990s, annual private investment in infrastructure in developing countries has stabilized in the 
11-to-16 billion USD range since 2001 with a debt-equity distribution that varies across regions. For 
instance, while bonds have become an important tool for financing infrastructure investments in the 
Latin America and East Asia regions, representing, during the 1996-2004 period, 29% and 14% of 
infrastructure financing respectively, bond financing is nearly non-existent in the Middle East and 
North Africa region where about 98% of private investments in infrastructure has been in the form of 
loans from banks.  
 
Because they mobilize lumpy investment and deliver future payoff in local currency, infrastructure 
projects financed with hard currency are exposed to currency devaluation and to the volatility of 
interest rates. Therefore, strengthening the capacity of local financial markets so they can extend debt 
and equity financing instruments denominated in local currency in competitive terms is crucial to 
                                        
1Empirical work (Yepes, 2008) suggests that developing countries need to invest approximately 5 to 7 percent of their 
GDP in infrastructures to be able to maintain economic growth in the period 2008-2115 at their current average rate of 5 
percent. For a survey on the relationship between infrastructure development and growth, see Straub (2008). 
2The experiences of Cameroon, Nigeria, and Tanzania have indeed shown how macroeconomic, institutional, and 
financial reforms can increase longer-term local currency financing for banks, and therefore progressively increase local 
bank financing for infrastructure projects.  
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accelerating private investment in infrastructure in developing countries. In the late 1980s-early 
1990s, developing countries sought to develop their financial markets by implementing structural 
reforms including removing regulatory bottlenecks and rolling back the interventionist role of the 
state through privatization of commercial banks or by strengthening the independence of central 
banks. In parallel, project sponsors have also attempted to increase the use of local currency loans in 
closing the financing of infrastructure projects in developing countries.3 These efforts to develop 
appropriate local financial markets have however faced further difficulties due to the nature and 
profile of infrastructure projects (high economic stakes, long payback, and exposure to political 
interferences). 
 
While the need for developing countries to foster investment in infrastructure sectors has been 
emphasized in the literature, the issue of these countries’ limitations to attract private capital remains 
relatively weakly explored. This paper seeks to contribute to filling this void by testing that the level 
of economic and financial development of a country is a good "predictor" of its ability to attract 
private investment in infrastructure projects. We specify a regression model that we fit to a 1990-
2007 annual data set on the power sector in 37 developing countries. 
 
Our findings suggest that a country’s level of economic development matters to private investors 
seeking to enter infrastructure sectors in developing countries. Similarly, we find empirical evidence 
that the level of development of a country financial sector, in particular the extent to which local 
capital markets are developed, is a key determinant of private investment in the power sector. As can 
be expected, quality of governance, and risk factors, such as exchange rate fluctuations, also 
influence private investors’ decisions. In all our regressions, the existence of an autonomous energy 
sector regulator is found to significantly simulate private investment in power projects. These effects 
are significant even when we account for the interactions between economic growth and financial 
sector development. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the literature that discusses 
the role of infrastructure in development, its financing, and the determinants of private participation 
in infrastructure projects. Section 3 describes the data used, the main variables of interest, and briefly 
discusses some simple properties of the data. Section 4 presents the econometric approach used to 
                                        
3Note, however, that these initiatives have only led to some local currency loans and bond issuances mainly concerned 
telecom projects. 
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analyze the data. Sections 5 through 8 present the results of our econometric analysis. Section 9 
concludes and the appendix provides some complementary material. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
The importance of infrastructure development for poverty reduction and long-run economic growth 
in low-income and developing countries started being highlighted in the 1990s, and this view has 
been since reinforced. The relationship between infrastructure development and economic growth 
has been characterized as one of a "virtuous circle" in the sense that a sustainable development in 
infrastructure is not possible without strong economic growth and growth is not possible without 
substantial improvements in the delivery of infrastructure services (The World Bank, 2006).4  
 
As in most parts of the world, infrastructure services were traditionally provided by stated-owned 
vertically integrated monopolies in developing countries.5 This model became plagued by poor 
performance due to various factors including political interference, inefficient management, and 
under-investment. Under limited resources, the public sector alone in developing countries cannot 
ensure adequate infrastructure funding together with the operational activities necessary to 
effectively provide quality of service (Saidi, 2006). Consequently, existing infrastructures in 
developing countries need upgrading and modernization. This situation has made the financing of 
infrastructure projects even more challenging as demand for infrastructure services has substantially 
increased following population growth and large-scale urbanization. 
 
To reduce the gap between infrastructure demand and supply in developing countries, partnerships 
between public and private sectors have been advocated. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) became 
one of the most popular financial mechanisms used to mobilize private capital for infrastructure 
financing. Local currency financing would have been preferred in most cases to avoid exposure to 
foreign exchange risk, whereas infrastructure projects with private participation are often financed 
                                        
4It has been argued that infrastructure contributes to growth by enlarging markets, reducing trade barriers and economic 
risk of private investments, and increasing productivity, output, and employment (Prud’homme, 2004, Saidi, 2006). 
Infrastructure development contributes to poverty reduction by enhancing the poor’s access to local and foreign markets 
and providing them with better information on market opportunities and ways to improve their standards of living 
(Jerome, 2008). 
5The public good nature of infrastructure services, the existence of externalities, and the incompleteness of markets are 
the main market failures invoked to justify state intervention (Calitz and Fourie, 2007). However, infrastructure services 
are increasingly becoming rival and excludable goods, therefore questioning the necessity of public intervention. 
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with a mix of hard currency denominated equity and non-recourse debt.6  
 
Partnerships between the public and private sectors were viewed as mechanisms that would allow 
gathering and channeling the needed amount of resources to sustain growth and alleviate poverty in 
developing countries (The World Bank, 2006). Consequently, many developing countries undertook 
large-scale reforms of their infrastructure sectors in the late 1980s-early 1990s with the goal of 
promoting competition through liberalization, improving regulation of the sectors, and involving 
private and foreign actors in infrastructure ownership, management, operations, and service 
provision. Despite these reforms, developing countries still have to enhance private sector 
involvement in infrastructure financing through the implementation of coordinated reforms in the 
financial sector.7 
 
Stimulating private participation in the provision of public services is challenging, and even more so 
for low-income and developing countries. Projects design, risks identification and allocation, the 
availability of risk mitigation financial instruments, the institutional and regulatory framework, and 
the local financial markets’ depth and composition are all but some of the key determinants of a 
country’s ability to successfully mobilize private investment (Calitz and Fourie, 2007).8 It is often 
argued that the difficulties of developing countries in attracting private investors in infrastructure 
sectors are essentially due to their poor or non-existent sovereign creditworthiness which partly can 
be explained by low income levels leading to low investor confidence in long-term policies, under-
                                        
6 The borrower of a non-recourse debt is typically a special-purpose entity (PPP) created to own an infrastructure project. 
Investors (shareholders) that own this entity have generally no responsibility to repay the debt used to finance the special-
purpose entity. Shareholders often finance 20% of the project (in equity) and the remaining 80% is usually financed 
through a bank loan guaranteed by the government (through the PPP). If borrowers fail to reimburse, the only recourse 
for the bank is to "step in" the entity’s management if the failure is due to a managerial problem. Collective bond 
issuances are also often used. They consist of a credible intermediary, such as the central government, which establishes 
a Bond Bank that collects all the borrowing needs of municipalities and issues a single class of bond backed up by a 
diversified pool of loans. Platz (2009) argues that a particular attention should be paid to sub-sovereign bonds, essentially 
issued in local currency, as a source of infrastructure financing instrument as they "… generally target domestic capital 
market investors who are more familiar with the local governments than international creditors ...". 
7Between 1997 and 2004, developing countries received only a small share of private investment. Africa attracted less 
non-recourse debt than other regions and has been less successful in raising financing through bond issuance. Moreover, 
most of the bond financing in Africa during this period was for South-African projects through local currency issues in 
the local capital markets (Sheppard et al.  2006). 
8The World Bank (2006) has highlighted that the susceptibility of projects to governance, corruption, and political 
interference may alter private investment and advocated the need for governments to implement anti-corruption 
instruments and improve governance and rule of law, including investors’ protection. Jerome (2008) underlines the 
importance of institutional and fiscal reforms. Although the depth and composition of local capital markets significantly 
affects their ability to mobilize capital, their actual ability to provide infrastructure financing depends on other factors, 
including the size of the domestic economy, the level of per capita income, macroeconomic stability, and the 
development of contractual savings institutions such as pension funds and life insurance (Sheppard, 2006). 
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developed financial markets which do not offer enough capital and proper financial instruments, and 
high economic risk of infrastructure projects in these countries (Sheppard et al. 2006, Saidi, 2006, 
Jerome, 2008). All these factors alter private investors’ confidence and therefore their investment 
decisions.9 
 
As indicated earlier, infrastructure projects are preferably financed with a combination of local 
currency bonds and non-recourse debt. The domestic financial sector’s depth and composition are 
therefore key determinants of a country’s attractiveness for private investors.10 As infrastructure 
projects tend to be riskier than other sectors’ projects, due to their longer payback and build-out 
periods and their exposure to political and regulatory risks, proper risk mitigating instruments are 
needed to improve investors’ confidence.   
 
Developing and low-income countries are characterized by under-developed financial markets which 
essentially offer short-term local currency financing. Moreover, these markets often involve only a 
small number of players therefore reducing competition, distorting yields, and ultimately leading to 
high transaction costs (Platz, 2009).11  
 
In recent years, commercial banks in developing countries have gained increased exposure to non-
recourse project financing in loan clubs or syndications led by major international banks. But, due to 
their difficulties to mobilize long-term finance, their overall ability to extend long-term loans in local 
currency to infrastructure PPP projects is significantly impeded (Sheppard, 2006).12 Furthermore, in 
most developing countries’ bond and secondary markets are embryonic or non-existent, and cannot 
therefore offer financial and risk mitigating instruments required for infrastructure projects (Gupta et 
al., 2001). While many developing countries have implemented structural reforms to further deepen 
their financial and capital markets since the mid-late 1990s, their financial sectors have not yet 
                                        
9For instance, only 16 of 48 African countries have foreign currency debt ratings and only 4 of these 16 have ratings that 
give relatively broad access to financial markets (BB- or higher). These 4 countries represent 43% of regional GNI 
(dominated by South Africa) while this share represents more than two third of regional GNI in other developing regions. 
10The OECD (2006) emphasizes the key role of financial markets development in promoting investment in infrastructure 
in the medium term.  
11South Africa is an exception in Sub-Saharan Africa with a relatively well developed financial system capable of 
providing long-term local currency funding for infrastructure projects. Moreover, "… the government is a potential 
borrower of good standing, domestically and internationally, and has a significant borrowing capacity. Consequently, 
public-private partnerships have steadily developed in South Africa during the past 20 years." (Calitz and Fourie, 2007). 
12Financial intermediaries facilitate transactions, allocate capital, and collect savings. Therefore, an under-developed 
financial system may prevent households accessing banks and other institutions to deposit their savings, which could be 
used for infrastructure financing. The most prominent low- and middle- income countries with domestic banks that are 
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reached a level of development required to catalyze the development of private investment in 
infrastructure.  
 
Some empirical studies have investigated the determinants of private investment in developing 
countries, but most of them consider private flows to the economy as a whole and not to specific 
infrastructure sectors. Moreover, to our knowledge, very few empirical analyses have investigated 
the attractiveness of a country’s overall economic development level or financial development level 
to private investors in developing countries. 
 
Pargal (2003) examines the effects of the regulatory framework on private investment in 
infrastructure in nine Latin American countries from 1980 to 1998 and finds that the investment 
regime’s liberalization and the existence of independent regulatory agencies are the most significant 
institutional determinant of private investment. Ouattara (2004) investigates the long-run 
determinants of private investment in Senegal from 1970 to 2000 and reaches the conclusion that 
public investment, GDP per capita, and foreign aid positively influence private investment. In 
contrast, credit to the private sector and terms of trade surprisingly tend to hinder private investment 
in Senegal. Likewise, Zerfu (2001) finds that GDP, its growth rate, and public investment in 
infrastructure significantly foster private investment in Ethiopia while lack of macroeconomic 
stability tend to negatively affect investment.  
 
Examining the determinants of infrastructure private investment in 61 developing countries over the 
period 1970-2003, Kinda (2008) also finds a significant positive effect of economic growth, physical 
infrastructure, and level of development of the financial sector, in particular, credit granted to the 
private sector by the banking sector. He also finds out, as in previous studies, that private investment 
is negatively influenced by macroeconomic and political instability. For the case of Ghana during the 
period 1970-1992, Asante (2000) finds that public investment, lagged private investment, and the 
growth of real credit to the private sector are key determinants of private investment. However, the 
author finds that the growth rate of GDP negatively influences private investment and so does 
macroeconomic and political instability. 
 
3. The data 
 
                                                                                                                                  
active in the project finance market are China, India, Malaysia, South Africa, and Thailand. 
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To investigate the influence that a country’s level of economic and financial sector development 
level on private investment in the power sector in developing countries, we collected data on the 37 
developing countries in Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-
Saharan Africa shown in Table 1 below.13 We note that 31 of these countries are middle income 
countries (MIC), meaning that they have relatively high growth rates and active financial sectors, 
enough to allow us to capture any potential effect of economic growth and financial sector 
development on private investment. In additional, autonomous energy sector regulatory authorities 
have been created in most of these countries during the period covered by our sample. 
 
Table 2 below exhibits the list of variables on which data have been collected. More detailed 
information on these variables is given in Table A1 of the appendix. Here, we synthesize the main 
features of the variables. The dependent variable "Private capital in energy sector," is labeled privinvt. 
This variable represents the total amount, in millions of 2005 USD, of private investments in power 
projects undertaken in a given country during a given year.14 The independent variables that will 
draw much of our attention are regrouped under the labels "Economic development" and "Financial 
sector development." Overall economic development is represented by the variable growth, the growth rate of 
GDP per capita while the variable findev is used to represent the level of development of a country’s 
financial sector. We also distinguish banking and capital market operations by using variables 
labelled bsdev and cmdev that reflect the development level of these respective (sub-) sectors.  
 
The levels of financial sector development findev, bsdev, and cmdev are variables that are calculated 
as the first principal components of variables that represent the development level of the banking and 
the capital market sectors. For the banking sector we use the variables CBA, DMBA, and CBPC. 
Expressed as fractions of GDP, these variables represent, respectively, total assets held by the 
Central Bank, total assets held by domestic financial institutions, and total loans granted by 
commercial banks to domestic corporate and households.15 As to the capital market, we use the 
variables SMC, TVT, and SMT. The variables SMC and TVT are also expressed as ratios to GDP and 
represent, respectively, stock market capitalization and value of shares traded on the stock market. 
These variables are meant to measure the size of the capital market and its liquidity respectively. The 
variable SMT is a market turnover variable that is meant to assess the stock market’s efficiency. For a 
                                        
13 A country is considered as lower middle income when its 2008 GNI per capita is between USD 976 and USD 3,855, a 
higher middle income country when its 2008 GNI per capita is between USD 3,856 and USD 11,905, and as a low 
income country when its GNI per capita is equal to USD 975 or less. 
14 No distinction between local and foreign private investment is made in this paper. 
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given year, it is calculated as the ratio of the total value of shares traded to the average market 
capitalization. 
 
Table 1 
Sample countries 
Country World Bank Region World Bank income group 
Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Bangladesh South Asia Low income 
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
China East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Egypt Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
India South Asia Lower middle income 
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Malaysia East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income 
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Moldova Europe and Central Asia Lower middle income 
Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Panama Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Peru Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Philippines East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
Syria Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Thailand East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income 
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Venezuela Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Yemen Middle East & North Africa Low income 
                                                                                                                                  
15The variable DMBA is meant to capture the depth of the banking sector. 
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Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
 
 
 
 
In addition to these variables, we use some variables of the quality of a country’s institutions, the 
level of risk, and the structure of regulation. A first group of variables, under the label "Institutional 
quality and risk," is meant to represent the degree of corruption of the country’s political system 
(corruption), the ability of the country’s government to commit to its announced economic program 
(govtstability), the extent of the legal system’s impartiality and the observance of the law 
(lawandorder), the overall quality of the regulatory governance (regquality), the country’s level of 
political and economic risk (countryrisk), and its exchange rate risk (exchraterisk). Finally, we 
account for the way "Energy sector regulation" is structured through the use of a variable (indepreg) 
that informs us on the existence of an autonomous energy/electricity sector regulator. 
 
Table 3 gives some descriptive statistics on the variables. Developing countries attracted around 
USD 575 million on average between 1990 and 2007. The high standard deviation of private 
investment suggests that the latter has varied much across countries and years. The average growth 
rate of GDP per capita is 1.84% and the high standard deviation of this variable suggests that the 
countries in our sample have experienced quite different level of overall economic development.  As 
to countries’ financial sector development, by scrutinizing the different dimensions of the financial 
sector, we see that there is enough variability in the variables that represent them, yet somewhat than 
the one representing overall economic development. 
 
Simple correlation coefficients between the variable representing private investment in energy 
projects, privinvt, and the main explanatory variables are presented in Table 4. These coefficients 
show that private investment is positively correlated with all variables, the higher correlation being 
with financial sector development, in particular, capital markets’ development. The existence of an 
autonomous regulator and the country’s overall quality of governance are also variables that are 
noticeably (positively) correlated with private investment. While these correlations give some useful 
preliminary indications on the sign and the magnitude of the relationships between our variables of 
interest, the next step in the analysis is to further explore these relationships through an econometric 
test. To this end, we use dynamic panel regression models and estimate them by applying Arellano-
Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) 
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estimation method. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Variables and designation  
Variable Designation 
Private capital in energy sector 
privinvt Private investment in energy projects  
 
Economic development 
growth Growth rate of GDP per capita  
 
Financial development 
findev Overall financial development variable  
bsdev Banking sector development variable  
 cmdev Capital markets development variable  
 
Institutional quality and risk 
corruption Corruption index  
 govtstability Government stability variable  
lawandorder Law and order variable  
regquality Index of regulatory governance quality 
countryrisk Country risk index  
exchraterisk Exchange rate risk index  
 
Energy sector regulation 
 
indepreg Separated regulatory authority variable 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median 
privinvt 497 574.62 1430.47 0 13910 0 
growth 666 1.84 4.88 -30.86 16.15 2.49 
findev 472 -3.25E-09 1.78 -3.72 3.61 -0.54 
bsdev 571 -3.21E-09 1.39 -2.70 2.60 -0.02 
cmdev 536 -3.71E-09 1.53 -2.99 2.88 0.09 
CBA 575 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.71 0.06 
DMBA 584 0.41 0.28 0.07 1.73 0.35 
CBPC 586 0.35 0.30 0.04 1.66 0.25 
SMC 545 0.34 0.44 0.00 2.82 0.19 
SMT 546 0.28 0.42 0.00 3.44 0.12 
TVT 549 0.12 0.26 0.00 2.37 0.03 
corruption 650 3 1 0 5 3 
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govtstability 650 8 2 1 12 8 
lawandorder 650 3 1 0 6 3 
regquality 333 -0.15 0.65 -2.37 1.48 -0.07 
countryrisk 650 65 8 35 82 67 
exchraterisk 650 8 2 0 10 8 
indepreg 666 0.39 0.49 0 1 0 
 
Table 4* 
Correlation coefficients 
Variable Correlation coefficient 
growth 0.033 
findev 0.249 
bsdev 0.089 
cmdev 0.312 
corruption 0.011 
govtstability 0.068 
lawandorder 0.066 
regquality 0.181 
countryrisk 0.173 
exchraterisk 0.044 
indepreg 0.200 
*This table gives the correlation coefficients between the variable of primary interest, privinvt, and the  
 variables shown in the first column.  
 
4. Econometric specification 
 
To evaluate whether or not a country’s level of economic and financial sector development is a key 
determinant of private investment in the power sector in developing countries, we run a set of 
regressions with the level of annual private investment in energy projects as the dependent variable. 
In addition to the independent variables of main interest, namely, those used to proxy the levels of 
economic and financial sector development, the set of right-hand variables of these regressions 
comprises variables that capture some important features such the country’s institutional and 
regulatory environment.16 Thus, these regressions provide us with a framework for empirically 
testing the hypothesis that the level of economic and financial sector development is a key driver of 
private investment in developing countries’ infrastructure projects while controlling for these other 
features of a country’s economy. 
 
Given that our data are in a pooled time-series cross-sectional form, we specify dynamic econometric 
models and estimate them using the one-step (robust) System Generalized Method of Moments 
                                        
16 Of particular interest to us is the role that the creation of an autonomous regulator and the country’s overall quality of 
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(SYS-GMM) developed by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) for dynamic panel 
models.17 It is well known that in such a modeling framework (see Beck and Katz, 2004) "…with a 
non-stationary dependent variable, the dispersion of the value of the coefficient in an AR (1) process 
found with different asymptotically equivalent methods often exceeds its standard errors." We 
therefore test whether the dependent variable was stationary.18  
 
Since the moment conditions used to estimate the models are valid only if there is no serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors, an Arellano-Bond test of the hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
in the first-differenced errors and a Hansen-J test of the null hypothesis that over-identifying 
restrictions are valid are also performed for each model.19 The Dif-Hansen statistic allows us to test 
that additional SYS-GMM moment conditions used are valid.20 To avoid over-fitting bias, i.e., using 
too many moment conditions, we made sure that the number of instruments used (the lags of the 
dependent variable) is not "too high" relative to the number of observations.21 The joint significance 
of the explanatory variables is testing with a Fisher test and endogeneity of the main variables of 
interest is addressed by means of a Hausman test. 
 
Our econometric analysis of the impact of the level of economic and financial sector development of 
a country on its ability to attract private investment is built on a stepwise procedure that is organized 
around two main objectives. A first objective is to examine whether overall economic development 
and financial sector development levels are indeed key determinants of private investment. A second 
objective is to further explore the impact of the level of financial sector development, if found to be 
significant, by decomposing it into its banking sector and financial market components.  
 
The first objective is tackled by means of regressions of the following general form: 
 
'
1 1 2 3 x (1)it it it it itprivinvt privinvt growth findev          
 
                                                                                                                                  
governance have played in building commitment of the private sector to fund energy projects. 
17 The general structure of this estimation method is sketched in the appendix. 
18 This test showed that the dependent variable does not contain a unit root (details are available from the authors upon 
request). 
19 While first-order autocorrelation is expected, rejecting the hypothesis of no serial correlation at higher orders implies 
that instruments are not valid. Note that Hansen-J test results are robust but can be weakened by the use of too many 
instruments. 
20 With the estimation method used, however, Dif-Sargan test is not robust. We therefore present Dif-Hansen results 
instead. 
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where 1,2,...,37; 1,2,...,18i t   are indices that refer to the country and the year respectively, the 
variables privinvt , growth , and findev  are as defined in the previous section, i , 1, 2,3i   are the 
associated coefficients, x  is a vector of control variables that are shown in Table 2 under the labels 
"Institutional quality and risk" and "Energy sector regulation,"   is the vector of coefficients 
associated with these control variables, and   is the error term. 
 
To achieve the second objective, which is to further refine the analysis of the level of the financial 
sector development effect on volume of private investment in the power sector, we disaggregate the 
measure of the financial sector development level into its banking and capital market parts. Hence, 
we use the following general equation: 
 
'
1 1 2 3 3 x (2)it it it it it itprivinvt privinvt growth bsdev cmdev            
 
where bsdev  and cmdev  are as defined in section 3 above.   
 
5. The effect of the overall economic development level on private investment in 
the power sector 
 
Tables 5-12 below give the SYS-GMM parameter estimates of a set of regressions derived from 
equation (4).22 Part from the parameter estimates, the tables also report the number of observations 
actually used to estimate each model, Fisher F statistic testing the joint significance of the 
independent variables, Arellano-Bond first and second autocorrelation coefficients of the first-
differenced residuals, the Hansen J statistic for testing the validity of instruments, and the Dif-
Hansen statistic allowing testing the validity of the additional SYS-GMM moment conditions.23  
 
The analysis that led to Tables 5-7 focuses on the level of overall economic development as a factor 
that attracts private investors into the energy sector. From Table 5, we see that with a simple 
dynamic model having growth of GDP per capita as the sole explanatory variable, besides previous 
year volume of private investment, we obtain coefficients that are significant at the 5% level.24 This 
                                                                                                                                  
21 The number of lags was limited to 6. 
22 For notational simplicity the first-difference operator is omitted in the tables. Moreover, we indicate by *, **, and *** 
respectively significance at the 20%, 10%, and 5%. 
23 We also report Arellano-Bond third autocorrelation coefficients when relevant. 
24 Second-order autocorrelation is rejected in most of the models and variables lagged two or more periods are used as 
instruments. Furthermore, the J statistic does not reject the validity of instruments in all models and the Dif-Hansen 
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confirms both the presence of a dynamic structure in the flow of private electricity projects funding 
and that overall economic development is a signal that is positively interpreted by private investors. 
 
Table 5 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6782351*** .0481902 
growth .9667271*** .289288 
Obs. 436  
Fisher test F(2, 34)  = 124.83***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.67***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 0.78  
Hansen-J chi2(58)   =  29.83  
Dif-Hansen chi2(30)   =   5.69  
 
While the results exhibited in Table 5 are interesting by themselves as they confirm our intuition, 
there are at least two reasons that suggest extending the underlying model. First, the model is so 
parsimonious that the variable omission bias is a real threat. Second, as discussed earlier in the paper, 
besides uncovering the attractiveness of the economic and financial sector development of a country 
to potential private investors, we are also interested in the effect of the political and institutional 
environment of the country on private investment. Tables 6 and 7 below present results obtained 
when we estimate the economic growth effect while first controlling for the quality of governance in 
the whole economy (Table 6) and then for both that quality and for the existence of an independent 
regulatory authority in the energy sector (Table 7).25 We see that the coefficients of these control 
variables have the expected sign and are significant, and that the overall economic development as 
measured remain highly is significant even when we adjust for the institutional environment. 
 
Table 6 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6880732*** .1113495 
growth .6551585*** .1988469 
regquality 121.1382** 68.03486 
Obs. 248  
Fisher test F(3, 33) =  21.39***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.20***  
                                                                                                                                  
statistic validates the additional SYS-GMM moment conditions. Finally, Hausman test results show that economic and 
financial development variables are exogenous in most of the models. In the few cases where this is not the case, the 
variables of interest are therefore instrumented. For a treatment of the endogeneity of institutional variables in 
infrastructure sectors, see Gasmi et al. (2009). 
 
25 Note that we systematically incorporate all the control variables in the models estimated, but we only keep and present 
those with reasonable goodness-of-fit.    
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Arellano Bond test - Order 2 2.22***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 3 -1.26  
Hansen-J chi2(13)   =   8.95  
Dif-Hansen chi2(9)    =   4.29  
 
 
Table 7 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6655032*** .1001062 
growth .2784228** .1496112 
regquality 100.8325* 74.44351 
indepreg 354.6202*** 142.9526 
Obs. 248  
Fisher test F(4, 33)   =   20.17***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.22***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 2.25***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 3 -1.13  
Hansen-J chi2(13)   =  11.08  
Dif-Hansen chi2(9)    =   5.95  
 
6. The effect of the financial sector development level on private investment in the 
power sector 
 
Let us now examine the financial sector effect. Tables 8-10 below present the results of an analysis 
that follows the same approach as for the case of the overall economic development level discussed 
above. We first focus on the level of financial sector development and subsequently add risk and 
institutional quality variables. We then start from the estimation of a "naive" dynamic model in 
which we assume that the level of development of the financial sector, findev, is the only factor that 
affects private investment (Table 8). We then introduce control variables to adjust for the effect of 
financial risk (Table 9) and both the effects of financial risk and institutional environment (Table 10). 
Here again, the results supports the proposition that the state of development of the financial sector 
matters for private investors. 
 
As can be seen from Table 8, financial sector development significantly influences private 
investment in developing countries’ power projects as findev is found to be significantly and 
positively related to private investment. We next examine the importance of the institutional 
environment and risk factors for private investors when considering the level of development of 
developing countries’ financial sector. Table 9 confirms that financial sector development positively 
and significantly affects private investment, and also emphasizes that among all institutional and risk 
measures considered in this study, exchange rate risk is key determinant to private investment in the 
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power sector. Our findings therefore suggest that, when assessing the financial sector’s development 
of a country, private investors also take the country’s level of exchange rate risk into account. Hence, 
the latter appears to be the most important risk factor that can hinder the private sector’s 
participation in power projects’ funding. 
 
Table 8 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6762986*** .0525712 
findev 231.7872*** 103.6243 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(2, 28)  =  86.86***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.31***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.07  
Hansen-J chi2(58)   =  26.49  
Dif-Hansen chi2(30)   =   4.09  
 
Table 9 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6564802*** .0476423 
findev 109.5548** 59.46446 
exchraterisk  28.64363*** 8.754116 
Obs. 306  
Fisher test F(3, 28) =  90.35***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.35***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.03  
Hansen-J chi2(29)   =  23.29  
Dif-Hansen chi2(15)   =   7.05  
 
When investigating whether the existence of an autonomous energy regulator matters for private 
investors by adding the variable indepreg as an independent variable in the previous model, our 
results (Table 10) show that the effects of findev and exchraterisk on private investment are not 
altered as both variables still significantly impact private investment in power projects. Our findings 
also highlight that the existence of an autonomous energy regulator matters for private investment as 
the variable indepreg significantly increases the volume of private investment. It therefore appears 
that developing countries’ domestic financial sector’s development, their level of exchange rate risk 
and their regulatory framework, more specifically, the existence of an autonomous energy regulator, 
are all but important determinants of private investment in these countries’ energy projects. 
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Table 10 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .54575*** .0912674 
findev 122.0128** 71.0817 
exchraterisk 18.28363*** 8.137896 
indepreg 364.9427* 257.483 
Obs. 306  
Fisher test F(4, 28)  =  23.08***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.45***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.07  
Hansen-J chi2(23)   =  24.34  
Dif-Hansen chi2(12)   =  12.44  
 
7. Putting together the effects of the overall economic and financial sector 
development levels on investment in the power sector 
 
The results discussed so far indicate that economic growth and financial development are both key 
determinants of the volume of private investment in developing countries’ energy projects. More 
specifically, our analysis has shown that higher economic and financial development is associated to 
higher private investment. We therefore express this latter as a function of both variables as 
described by equation (1) to check whether these effects still hold when the potential interactions 
between these variables are taken into account by applying the same methodology as in the previous 
sections. Tables 11 and 12 present our empirical results. 
 
From Table 11 we see that both economic growth and financial sector development indeed remain 
positively and significantly related to the level of private investment in energy projects, thereby 
confirming our previous conclusion that these variables are key determinants of private involvement 
in infrastructure projects’ financing. When the institutional and risk variables are added to the model, 
none of them appear to significantly affect private investment. We therefore use the model growth 
and findev only to investigate the consistency of the importance of the existence of an independent 
energy sector regulator for private investors. 
 
Does the existence of an autonomous regulator still matter? We investigate this question by adding 
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indepreg as an independent variable in the previous model. We can see from our findings 
summarized in Table 12 that economic growth and the overall financial sector’s development still 
positively and significantly affect the volume of private investment. Moreover, the existence of an 
independent regulator also appears to significantly help improving private investors’ participation in 
energy projects’ funding, which is consistent with our previous findings. 
 
Table 11 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6756518*** .0402636 
growth .5322045** .2874486 
findev 99.72341** 57.81029 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(3, 28)  =  94.67***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.38***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 0.05  
Hansen-J chi2(29)   =  24.52  
Dif-Hansen chi2(15)   =  12.20  
 
Table 12 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficeint Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6449181*** .0806958 
growth .3440047* .239676 
findev 96.74427** 56.93634 
indepreg 293.5705* 189.4488 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(4, 28)  =  20.78***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.21***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 0.05  
Hansen-J chi2(25)   =  24.89  
Dif-Hansen chi2(13)   =  11.29  
 
8. Disentangling the effects of the banking sector and the financial market 
development levels on private investment in the power sector 
 
Now that the importance of the financial sector’s development in explaining the volume of private 
investment in developing countries’ energy projects is established, let us examine which of the 
banking sector and capital markets level of development drives these effects. We apply the same 
estimation methodology as in the previous sections and present results derived from equation (2). 
Table 13 displays estimation results with bsdev and cmdev as the sole independent variables. 
Estimates emphasize that the effect of the banking sector’s development level on private investment 
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is positive though not significant. In contrast, capital markets’ development significantly fosters 
private investment in developing countries’ power sector. These findings therefore suggest that the 
effects of the overall financial sector’s development are essentially driven by the level of domestic 
capital markets’ development. 
Table 13 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .7491106*** .0796758 
bsdev 84.48461 126.4848 
cmdev 231.4927** 122.9545 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(3, 28)= 68.96***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.42***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.05  
Hansen-J chi2(69)   =  22.96  
Dif-Hansen chi2(36)   =   0.67  
 
When institutional and risk factors are added to the model as explanatory variables (Table 14), our 
findings emphasize that while the banking sector’s development surprisingly has adverse, but not 
significant, effects on private investment, domestic capital markets’ development positively and 
significantly affects private investment in developing countries’ power projects. Hence these results 
lead to the conclusion that the significant positive effects of the overall financial sector development 
on private investment found in Table 9 can be essentially explained by capital markets’ level of 
development. Moreover, as in Table 9, exchange rate risk seems to be the most important risk factor 
that may prevent private investors from participating to energy projects’ financing. 
 
Table 14 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6406816*** .0431686 
bsdev -54.11392 48.85219 
cmdev 188.6785*** 68.38535 
exchraterisk 32.59895*** 8.212808 
Obs. 306  
Fisher test F(4, 28)  = 105.93***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.37***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.08  
Hansen-J chi2(29)   =  23.04  
Dif-Hansen chi2(15)   =   8.21  
 
When controlling for the energy sector regulatory framework (Table 15), capital markets’ 
development still positively and significantly explains the volume of private investment while, 
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though the effect is not significant, the latter tends to decrease with the banking sector’s 
development. Our results also show that exchange rate risk has adverse effects on developing 
countries’ energy projects attractiveness to private investors as a high exchange rate risk appears to 
reduce private investment. These findings therefore confirm our previous results from Table 14 as to 
the importance of capital markets’ development and exchange rate risk for the private sector’s 
investment decisions, and support the conclusion that the positive effects of financial development 
are driven by the domestic capital markets’ development. Furthermore, parameter estimates 
emphasize that investors are more willing to contribute to energy projects’ financing when there 
exists an independent regulator. Therefore, the domestic energy sector’s regulatory framework also 
matters for private investors. 
 
Table 15 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6151758*** .0482015 
Bsdev -44.05866 51.64461 
Cmdev 185.4939*** 66.0554 
exchraterisk 17.32381*** 7.450965 
Indepreg 299.4898* 221.1928 
Obs. 306  
Fisher test F(5, 28)  =  91.01***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.44***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 -0.05  
Hansen-J chi2(29)   =  25.19  
Dif-Hansen chi2(15)   =  11.28  
 
As the results from section 7 above suggest that overall economic and financial development levels 
are both key drivers of private investment when considered jointly, we examine in a final step 
whether the impact of financial sector development can be attributed to a financial sub-sector in 
particular, i.e., the banking sector or capital markets. Our empirical results displayed in Table 16 
confirm the importance of economic growth and capital markets’ development in developing 
countries’ attractiveness from private investors’ point of view. Indeed, the variables growth and 
cmdev positively and significantly affect private investment. These findings therefore provide strong 
evidence that the effects of the financial sector’s development on private investments are essentially 
driven by capital markets’ development. When controlling for the regulatory framework in the power 
sector (Table 17), we find that economic growth and capital markets’ development are still 
significant in explaining private investment. Our empirical results also highlight that the existence of 
an independent regulator in the energy sector plays an important role in the attractiveness of 
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developing countries’ energy projects for private investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6671741*** .0380519 
growth .5274156** .2763148 
bsdev .2763148 48.84709 
cmdev 157.4972*** 65.3211 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(4, 28)  =  82.99***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.40***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 0.01  
Hansen-J chi2(29)   =  21.73  
Dif-Hansen chi2(15)   =   5.41  
 
Table 17 
SYS-GMM parameter estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std error 
lag(privinvt) .6331002*** .0778513 
growth .3317886* .2178169 
bsdev -32.67342 46.29378 
cmdev 160.1594*** 65.28836 
indepreg 306.9391* 182.6289 
Obs. 307  
Fisher test F(5, 28)  =  18.41***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 1 -2.23***  
Arellano Bond test - Order 2 0.01  
Hansen-J chi2(25)   =  23.67  
Dif-Hansen chi2(13)   =   7.97  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
This paper has set the objective of empirically investigating the determinants of private investment in 
developing countries’ power projects, seeking to emphasize the importance of economic growth and 
financial sector development, using dynamic panel model specifications and accounting for some 
institutional and risk factors that may influence the private sector’s investment decisions. 
 
Our study of a time-series-cross-sectional data set on 37 developing countries from 1990 to 2007 
unambiguously demonstrates that economic growth is a key determinant to private investment in 
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power projects, and that private investors also account for countries’ governance quality. Our 
findings also emphasize that the existence of an autonomous energy sector regulator significantly 
contributes to improving the private sector’s involvement in power projects’ financing. Likewise, a 
well developed financial sector, in particular the existence of well established and developed capital 
market, is found to be a key determinant of private investment in power projects in developing 
countries. More importantly, our analysis has also shown that a country’s exchange rate risk is the 
most important risk factor that keeps private investors from participating in power projects in 
developing countries. 
 
Overall, our empirical results suggest that developing countries with a higher economic growth, a 
more developed financial sector, in particular, capital markets, a better governance and institutional 
framework attract more private capital for their infrastructure projects. Therefore, in their effort to 
attract more private investment, policy makers in developing countries should pay particular 
attention to enhancing the quality of regulation to ensure predictability and certainty while also 
deepening their domestic financial and capital markets. In a future paper, we will investigate the 
combined effects of financial and power sectors’ reforms on the performance of the power sector 
with the purpose of testing the hypothesis that financial reforms are a pre-condition to the successful 
implementation of infrastructure reforms. 
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Appendix 
Econometric method 
 
The data used in this paper is analyzed using a dynamic panel data econometric framework. A 
general linear dynamic panel-data model has the following form: 
 
' '
, 1 21
x wpit j i t j it it i itjy y          (A.3) 
 
where Ni ,....,1 and iTt ,....,1 are indices that refer to the country and the year respectively, ity  is 
a dependent variable, the j ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated, x it  is 1k -dimensional vector 
of strictly exogenous covariates, 1  is a the vector of corresponding unknown coefficients, w it  is a 
2k -dimensional vector of predetermined and endogenous covariates, 2  is the vector of 
corresponding unknown coefficients, i are the panel-level effects which may be correlated with the 
covariates, and it are error terms which are assumed to be i.i.d. with variance ²  and independent 
from i  for all i and over all t.26  
 
This model includes lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables and unobserved panel-
level effects that may be fixed or random. By construction, the lagged dependent variables are 
correlated with the unobserved panel-level effects, making standard estimation such as within-group 
estimator inconsistent. As proposed by Arellano-Bond (1991), these panel-level effects are removed 
by first-differencing the model, yielding:  
 
' '
, 1 21
x wpit j i t j it it itjy y              (A.4) 
 
Panel-level effects are eliminated but this transformation leads to another endogeneity problem due 
to the correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed errors. For 
instance, 1 ititit  is correlated with 1,,1,   tititi yyy as from equation (A.3) 1, tiy depends 
                                        
26 Exogenous covariates isx  are orthogonal to it  for all s and t while predetermined covariates isw  are orthogonal to is  
only for s t , i.e., ( ) 0is itE x   for all s  and t , ( ) 0is itE w    for s t , and ( ) 0is itE w    for s>t. 
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on 1it .  
 
To obtain consistent estimators for the dynamic panel-data model, Arellano-Bond (1991) proposed to 
use instruments to form moment conditions and apply GMM techniques developed by Hansen 
(1982).27 Indeed, although the first-differenced errors are correlated with the first-differenced 
covariates, they may be uncorrelated with certain lagged levels of the covariates. This method 
requires disturbances to be serially uncorrelated and estimates the model’s parameters by identifying 
how many lags of the dependent variable, the predetermined and endogenous covariates are valid 
instruments and how these lagged levels can be combined with first differences of the strictly 
exogenous covariates into a potentially large instrument matrix. Moment conditions are obtained 
from the first-differenced disturbances from equation (A.4) and instruments. Using this instrument 
matrix, Arellano and Bond (1991) derive the corresponding one-step and two-step GMM estimators 
(DIF-GMM). A serial correlation test of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors is derived from Arellano-Bond (1991).  
 
However, Arellano and Bond (1991) DIF-GMM estimator may be inconsistent if the autoregressive 
parameters are too large or the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effects to the variance of 
idiosyncratic error is too large. Based on their work, Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) developed a system estimator (SYS-GMM) which uses additional moment conditions. 
Indeed, in addition to the lagged levels used as instruments for the differenced equation (A.4) for the 
DIF-GMM estimator, SYS-GMM uses lagged first-differenced covariates as instruments for the level 
equation (A.1). New moment conditions are then derived from the disturbances in equation (A.1) and 
these additional instruments. This method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic errors and requires the initial condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with 
the first difference of the dependent variable’s 1st observation, i.e. 0][ 2  ii yE   for all i. In this 
paper, we have applied robust one-step SYS-GMM to estimate our models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
27 Note that the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is suited for panel data sets with "a large N and a small T". 
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Variables content and sources of data 
 
Table A1 
Content of variables and data sources 
Variable Content Source 
privinvt Total private investment in energy projects 
(in millions of 2005 USD). 
The World Bank Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
database (year). 
gdppercapita GDP per capita in 2005 USD. ERS International Macroeconomic 
dataset (2008). 
growth Growth rate of GDP per capita. Idem. 
CBA  Total assets held by the central bank 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank Financial 
Development and Structure 
database (2007). 
DMBA Total assets held by the financial 
institutions expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Idem. 
 
CBPC Credit granted by commercial banks to the 
private sector expressed as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Idem. 
 
 
SMC Value of stock market capitalization 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
TVT Total value of stocks traded expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
SMT Stock market turnover ratio calculated as 
the ratio of value of shares traded during a 
period to average market capitalization.  
Idem. 
 
 
countryrisk Composite country risk rating reflecting 
political, financial, and economic risk 
ranging from 0 to 100 (the higher the rating 
the lower the risk). 
International Country Risk Guide 
database (year). 
 
 
exchraterisk Exchange rate risk variable ranging from 0 
to 10 (the higher the value, the lower the 
risk). 
Idem. 
 
 
corruption Corruption index ranging from 0 to 6 (the 
higher the score, the less corrupt the 
economic system). 
Idem. 
 
 
govtstability Variable of the government's ability to stay 
in office and carry out its declared 
economic program ranging from 0 to 12 
(the higher the rating, the more stability 
there is). 
Idem. 
 
 
 
 
lawandorder Index with a "law" component assessing the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system 
and an "order" component assessing 
popular observance of the law. This index 
ranges from 0 to 6 (the higher the score, the 
better the legal environment). 
Idem. 
regquality Regulatory quality index assessing 
perceptions of the ability of the government 
private sector development. The score 
varies between -2.5 and +2.5 (the higher the 
score, the better the quality of governance). 
Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
indepreg Dichotomous variable that takes on the 
value 1 if there exists an energy regulatory 
separated from the executive branch of 
government and 0 otherwise. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) and 
various websites (see references). 
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